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Problem
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Abstract
Identity disclosure of an individual from a released data is a matter of concern
especially if it belongs to a category with low frequency in the data-set. Nayak et al.
(2016) discussed this problem vividly in a census report and suggested a method of
obfuscation, which would ensure that the probability of correctly identifying a unit
from released data, would not exceed ξ for some 1
3
< ξ < 1. However, we observe that
for the above method the level of security could be extended under certain conditions.
In this paper, we discuss some conditions under which one can achieve a security for
any 0 < ξ < 1.
1 Introduction
Many agencies release data to motivate statistical research and industrial work. But
often these data-sets carry some information which may be sensitive to the individual
bearing it. Erasing the name or some identity number associated with an individual may
not always be sufficient to hide the identity of the individual. For example, imagine a
situation where a data-set of p variables corresponding to n individuals are released and
among these p variables there is a variable named “pin-code”( sometimes called zip-code).
Now “pin-code” is not supposed to be a sensitive variable, but it may happen that the
intruder, who is trying to identify some individual in the data-set, has an idea about
where the individual lives and thus can guess his “pin-code”. In this case, if in the data-
set there is no other individual having the same “pin-code”, he can directly guess from
this information which row in the data-set corresponds to the individual and thus the
identity is revealed. Hence, suppressing identity numbers or names is not always sufficient
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to prevent identity disclosure. In case, there are a few variables with low frequency cells,
it is usually easy for the intruder to identify the individual.
Various articles including [5] [4] [2] have discussed this problem and various authors
have proposed different risk measures to evaluate the security in the released data. How-
ever, here we follow the framework of Nayak et. al. [2] where the intruder has a knowledge
of the variable category X(B) corresponding to his target unit B. If the variable X has
k categories c1, c2, . . . , ck, then we assume without loss of generality X(B) = c1 and the
frequencies of the categories in the data-set are T1, T2, . . . , Tk respectively.
If T1 = 1, i.e. only X(B) has category c1, the intruder can guess the row of his target
unit with certainty. If T1 is small, the intruder knows that his target unit is definitely
one of the T1 many units and then taking into consideration other information, he may
successfully identify the row of his target unit or make a correct guess. Thus, in this case,
the variable information must be suppressed before releasing the data.
One way to do that is to completely erase the variable but that is not desirable to the
statistician. The usual practice is to perturb the data in such a way so that the new data
can be treated like the original data in making statistical inferences.
If {X1,X2, · · · ,Xn} is the original data-set and {Z1, Z2, · · · , Zn} is the perturbed data
then the transition matrix P is given by, ((pij)) where,
pij = P [Z = cj |X = ci] , i, j = 1, 2, · · · k. (1)
This matrix is not released and is unknown to the statistician. This method of obfuscation
is known as the post-randomization method (PRAM). If we assumeT = (T1, T2, · · · , Tk) ∼
Multinomial(Π1,Π2, · · · ,Πk) then after transformation of X to Z, if S = (S1, S2, · · · , Sk)
are the frequencies of each class {c1, c2, · · · , ck} in the perturbed data, then S ∼Multinomial(Λ1,Λ2, · · · ,Λk),
where Λ = PΠ (Λ := (Λ1,Λ2, · · · ,Λk), Π := (Π1,Π2, · · · ,Πk)). If we want to treat Z as
the original data, we must have Π = Λ = PΠ. But Π is generally unknown to the one,
who is masking the data. However, he can estimate Π from the original data with T/n
where n is the total sample size. If we want S/n to be an unbiased estimator of Π, we
must have,
E[S |T] = T/n , or equivalently, PT = T. (2)
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Gouweleeuw et.al. ( 1998) [6] defined a post randomization method to be an invariant
PRAM if P satisfies Equation (2). The error due to estimation after post randomization
was studied in the literature by various authors including Nayak et. al. [7].
One of the common techniques to achieve an invariant PRAM is to use an Inverse
Frequency Post Randomization (IFPR) block diagonal matrix, in which the entire data-
set is partitioned into few groups and within each group, categories are interchanged. If
it is not desirable to change the category of some variable, it can be made to form its own
block. Thus, if there are m groups, given by {c1, c2, · · · , ck1}, {ck1+1, ck1+2, · · · , ck1+k2},
. . ., {ckm−1+1, ckm−1+2, · · · , ckm−1+km}, where k1+k2+ · · ·+km = k, then pij > 0 if cj and
ci fall into the same group and pij = 0 if cj and ci fall into different groups. Within each
group, pij is given by,
pij =


1− θ/Ti if i = j
θ
(k′−1)Ti
if i 6= j
, (3)
where 0 < θ < 1 and k′ > 1 is the block size of the group that i and j fall into.
However, the parameter θ of the model should be carefully chosen to ensure that the
perturbed data is secured from the intruder, at least, up to a certain extent. To measure the
risk of disclosure, Nayak et.al. [2] suggested checking whether the probability of correctly
identifying an individual given any structure of T and any value of S1 is bounded by
some specified quantity 0 < ξ < 1. Moreover, they showed that there exists a θ⋆, where
0 < θ⋆ < 1 which gives the transition matrix, P (θ⋆) = ((p⋆ij))1≤i≤k,1≤j≤k where p
⋆
ij is
chosen according to Equation (3) with θ = θ⋆ for each i, j = 1, 2, · · · , k1 and k1 is the
block size of the group c1 belongs to. Without loss of generality, we assume the block c1
belongs to is the first block. This matrix P (θ⋆) when used to post randomize X,
P [ CM | S1 = a, T = t] ≤ ξ ∀ a ≥ 0, ∀t, (4)
for any 13 ≤ ξ < 1, where CM denotes “Correct Match”. However, if we can extend the
search range of θ from 0 < θ < 1 to 0 < θ < T1 and can find all categories in the first
block that satisfy Tj ≥ T1 for all j 6= 1, then the level of security can be extended to
any 0 < ξ < 1. Note that, under this definition, there is no harm in the range of the
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probabilities as they certainly lie between 0 and 1. However, smaller the value of ξ, larger
the block size is required. Therefore we can extend the security as far as the frequency
distribution permits.
2 Our Approach
As mentioned earlier, our framework is similar to that of Nayak et.al. [2]. From the in-
truder’s point of view, we assume that as he gets access of the released data {Z1, Z2, · · · , Zn},
he checks the rows for which Zi = c1 for {i = 1, 2, · · · , n}. Let S1 be the total number
of units having class c1. If S1 = 0, intruder stops searching for his target unit B in the
data-set. If S1 = a for some a > 0, he selects one unit randomly among these a individuals
and concludes that to be his target unit B. Under this assumption, we discuss how to
choose the parameter θ of the IFPR block diagonal matrix ( See Equation (3)), depending
on T1, so that the probability of correctly identifying unit B is less than some specified
0 < ξ < 1. Our method is described in the following paragraph.
Fix a 0 < ξ < 1. Note that, if T1 >
1
ξ
, then there is no need for obfuscation as the
intruder can choose one unit randomly and conclude it as his target unit B. Since, in the
original data, the probability of correctly identifying B is 1/T1, if T1 >
1
ξ
, the probability
is less than ξ. This is quite intuitive since identification risk is a problem associated with
low-frequency classes. If T1 ≤
1
ξ
, then we find k1 = K1(ξ, T1) classes ( where the function
K1 is discussed in Sec. 3 ) such that for each of these classes {c1, c2, · · · , ck1}, Tj ≥ T1
for each j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k1}. Such an event is usually feasible for moderate values of ξ as
T1 usually has small values. If such classes are available, we can have any desired level
of security, i.e., for any fixed 0 < ξ < 1, there exists a corresponding θ⋆ such that if the
data is perturbed with matrix P (θ⋆), Equation (4) holds. If, however, such classes are
not available, we can find the integer n⋆ such that 1
n⋆
≤ ξ < 1
n⋆−1 . Since k1 classes are
not available such that Tj ≥ T1 for each j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k1}, we now set ξ1 =
1
n⋆−1 and try
to find k11 = K1(T1, ξ1) classes such that Tj ≥ T1 for each j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k
1
1}. If we fail,
we next try for ξ2 =
1
n⋆−2 and so on until we get a success for some ξl =
1
n⋆−l
. Since for
ξ = 1
n⋆−l
, there exists kl1 = K1(T1, ξl) classes such that Tj ≥ T1 for each j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k
l
1},
and a θ⋆, such that if the data is perturbed with P (θ⋆), then Equation (4) is satisfied for
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any 1
n⋆−l
< ξ < 1. According to Nayak et. al. [2], there is always a solution for ξ ≥ 13
which implies n⋆ can take a minimum value. However, n⋆ can take higher values in many
cases.
3 Model,Assumptions and Results
As discussed earlier, the goal of the paper is to find out a method by which a data can be
perturbed ensuring as much security as possible. Since security is an abstract term, we
limit ourselves to ensure that the measure, given by Equation (4)) holds for low values of
ξ. Smaller the value of ξ, better the security of the data. Let us denote, by R1(a, t), the
probability of correctly identifying the individual from released data given S1 = a and the
frequency distribution of X given by t := (t1, t2, · · · , tk). In other words,
R1(a, t) = P [CM | S1 = a, T = t], a ≥ 0, t ∈ R
k. (5)
If R1(a, t) is bounded by ξ for any t, then note that
R1(a) = P [CM | S1 = a], (6)
is bounded by ξ for any a ≥ 0, which signifies that the probability of correctly identifying
an individual is less than ξ, no matter how small or large the frequency of category c1 is,
in the released data. R1(a, t) is used instead of R1(a) because it is hard to calculate the
probability if t is not known. Note that, CM stands for “Correct Match” in the above
equations (5) (6).
Recall that if we use, IFPR block diagonal matrix to perturb X, the category c1 may
get changed to one of {c1, c2, . . . , ck1}, k1 ≥ 2 with positive probability. let us denote
αi = p1i, βi =
αi
1−αi
for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k1}. Observe that, R1(a, t) can be re-written as
R1(a, t) = P [CM | S1 = a, Z(B) = c1, T = t]P [Z(B) = c1 | S1 = a, T = t]
+P [CM | S1 = a, Z(B) 6= c1, T = t]P [Z(B) 6= c1 | S1 = a, T = t].
By our assumption, since the intruder searches his target unit B among the ones with
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category c1, P [CM | S1 = a, Z(B) 6= c1, T = t] = 0. Again, since, the intruder is assumed
to choose randomly one unit among a units to be B, P [CM |S1 = a, Z(B) = c1, T = t] =
1
a
for any t. Thus,
R1(a, t) =
1
a
P [Z(B) = c1 | S1 = a, T = t]. (7)
Again, we have,
P [Z(B) = c1, S1 = a, | T = t] = α1
∑ k1∏
i=1
(
T ⋆i
ai
)
αaii (1− αi)
T ⋆i −ai
= α1[
k1∏
i=1
(1− αi)
T ⋆i ]
∑ k1∏
i=1
(
T ⋆i
ai
)
βaii (8)
where T ⋆1 = T1 − 1, T
⋆
i = Ti, i ≥ 2 and the sum is over all integer-valued a1, a2, · · · ak1
such that 0 ≤ ai ≤ T
⋆
i and
∑
ai = a− 1. We denote the sum by Σa−1
P [Z(B) 6= c1, S1 = a, | T = t] = (1− α1)[
k1∏
i=1
(1− αi)
T ⋆i ]Σa (9)
Equation (8) and (9) implies that
P [S1 = a | T = t] =
k1∏
i=1
(1− αi)
T ⋆i (α1Σa−1 + (1− α1)Σa)
and since
P [Z(B) = c1 | S1 = a, T = t] =
P [Z(B) = c1, S1 = a | T = t]
P [S1 = a | T = t]
from Equation (7) , we finally have,
R1(a, t) =
1
a
[
α1Σa−1
α1Σa−1+(1−α1)Σa
]
= 1
a
[
1 + 1
β1
Σa
Σa−1
]−1
. (10)
Nayak et.al. [2] observed that although it seems intuitive that R1(1, t) ≥ R1(a, t) for
any t, a > 1 there are certain cases it does not hold true. However, they proved that if
α1 ≥ αj , i.e., β1 ≥ βj for all j = 1, 2, · · · , k1, then R1(1, t) ≥ R1(2, t) for any t. Intuitively,
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if β1 is highest, i.e., the odds that c1 goes to any category other than c1, then the risk of
disclosure should be maximum if a = 1. We checked that this is quite true which leads
us to our first result, stated in the following theorem and the proof is given in Appendix
Section.
Theorem 3.1. If α1 ≥ αj, i.e., β1 ≥ βj for any j = 1, 2, · · · , k1, then R1(1, t) ≥ R1(a, t)
for any t, a > 1, where R1(a, t) is given by Equation (10).
Assuming Theorem 3.1 holds, proving Equation (4) is equivalent to prove that R1(1, t) ≤
ξ for any t. For this condition to hold, we must carefully choose the parameter θ in (1).
Due to Nayak et. al. [2], we have,
R1(1, T ) =
[
T1 +
θ
T1 − θ
k1∑
i=2
θTi
(k1 − 1)Ti − θ
]−1
= (T1 − θ)
[
T1(T1 − θ) + θ
2
k1∑
i=2
Ti
(k1 − 1)Ti − θ
]−1
≤
T1 − θ
T1(T1 − θ) + θ2
= ψ(T1, θ) (11)
To proceed further we also need the following lemma, proof of which is deferred in
Appendix Section.
Lemma 3.2. For any fixed 0 < ξ < 1, there exists a θ⋆ ∈ (0, T1) such that ψ(θ, T1) ≤ ξ.
For Theorem 3.1 to hold, in an IFPR block diagonal matrix, we must have T1−θ
θ
≥
θ
(k1−θ)T1−θ
which leads to the condition, θ ≤ T1
1+
T1
Tj (k1−1)
, i.e., k1 − 1 ≥
θ
T1−θ
T1
Tj
. Note
that, if k1 − 1 ≥
θ
T1−θ
, and T1
Tj
≤ 1, k1 − 1 ≥
θ
T1−θ
T1
Tj
. Hence, it is enough to find
K(θ, T1) = 1 +
θ
T1−θ
= T1
T1−θ
for Theorem 3.1 to hold. Again, θ is chosen by solving
ψ(θ, T1) = ξ. Thus, for fixed ξ and T1 we have a θ and a corresponding K1(ξ, T1) which is
the largest integer contained in K(θ, T1). K1(ξ, T1) is the minimum number of categories
required to form the block containing c1. For some possible choices of ξ and some possible
values of T1, the value of K1(ξ, T1) is calculated and given in Table 1. While choosing the
block size, one must note that the block size k1 must be larger than or at least equal to
K1(ξ, T1) to ensure Equation (4).
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Table 1: Showing minimum block size required for some possible choices of security level
ξ and some possible values of class frequency T1
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍❍
T1
ξ
0.1 0.125 0.15 0.175 0.2 0.25 0.3
1 11 9 8 7 6 5 5
2 6 5 5 4 4 3 3
3 5 4 3 3 3 2 2
4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2
5 3 3 2 2 2 2 2
6 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
9 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
10 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
4 Simulation Results
To illustrate the process, we simulate a sample of size n = 2000 from k = 8 cate-
gories such that the probability of falling into a category is given by the vector Π =
(0.001, 0.1, 0.2, 0.05, 0.12, 0.13, 0.301, 0.098). The sample has frequency distribution given
by Table 2.
Table 2: Table showing frequencies of Categories for True Data from Simulated data-set
Category T
1 2
2 205
3 431
4 106
5 230
6 221
7 611
8 194
Two units in the data-set have Category 1, one of which is unit B = 780. Since
T1 = 2, the probability of Correct Match from true data is 0.5 which is very high. We
want this probability to be lower, say below ξ = 0.1. So, we transform the data to Z
using the IPRAM method with a transition matrix P . To choose an ideal P we apply the
procedure of this paper. From Table 1, we get the required block size is 6. So, we would
apply transition to the first k1 = 6 categories with the lowest probability of occurrence
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and do not alter the categories for the rest 2 categories. To solve for h(θ) = ξ, we have
θ⋆ = 1.656854 which gives the transition matrix,
P =


0.172 0.166 0 0.166 0.166 0.166 0 0.166
0.002 0.992 0 0.002 0.002 0.002 0 0.002
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0.003 0.003 0 0.984 0.003 0.003 0 0.003
0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0.993 0.001 0 0.001
0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0.001 0.993 0 0.001
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0.002 0.002 0 0.002 0.002 0.002 0 0.991


Using this transition matrix we ran 1000 simulations to get 1000 different Zs. The mean
squared estimation error for each category is given by E = (4.9350e − 07, 7.6125e −
07, 0.0000e+00, 7.4300e−07, 8.8550e−07, 7.8375e−07, 0.0000e+00, 8.5550e−07) which is
quite low and the average probability of correct match in 1000 simulations is 0.07639286 <
0.1.
The process thus seems to work well for simulated data.
5 Conclusion
The method works fine in most practical cases, because, in general, since we want to
obfuscate categories with low frequency, there will be sufficient number of categories with
higher frequency values than them. Accordingly, the security level can be increased.
However, the greatest drawback of this method of obfuscation is that we have assumed
the game of the intruder, i.e., it selects one of the units with the desired categorical value
randomly looking at the obfuscated data. But this is not expected to happen since in
most cases there will be many regressive variables associated and the selection will not be,
in general, random. This problem was also discussed in [4].
However, if the model assumptions hold true, the discussed method is successful in
giving a better security.
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Appendix
Proof to Theorem 3.1
To prove the result, we need to show R1(a + 1, T ) ≤ R1(1, T ), i.e.,
1
a+1 (1 +
Σa+1
Σaβ1
)−1 ≤
(1 + Σ
β1
)−1 which leads us to check an equivalent statement,
Σ˜a+1 − ΣΣ˜a + β1Σ˜a ≥ 0 (12)
where Σ˜a = a!Σa (Σa as defined in Equation (8) and (9)). Thus, we will need to check if
12 holds for all a and all k1 to prove Theorem 3.1.
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We will prove this result by a two dimensional induction procedure. First, we show that
the statement is true for k1 = 2 for all a ∈ N, then we show that if the statement is true
for k1 = k10 , then it is true for k1 = k10 + 1 for all a.
Case: k1 = 2: Since, Σ1 =
∑
T ⋆i βi and
Σ˜a =
a∑
s=0
(
a
s
) ∑
i1 6=i2
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)T
⋆
i2
(T ⋆i2 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i2
− a− s)βsi1β
a−s
i2
We have,
Σ˜aΣ1 =
∑a
s=0
(
a
s
)∑
i1 6=i2
T ⋆i1
2(T ⋆i1 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i1
− s+ 1)T ⋆i2(T
⋆
i2
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i2 − a− s)β
s+1
i1
βa−si2
+
∑a
s=0
(
a
s
)∑
i1 6=i2
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)T
⋆
i2
2(T ⋆i2 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i2
− a− s)βsi1β
a−s+1
i2
Writing Σa+1 similarly, we note that there are a+ 2 terms in the expansion of Σ˜a+1 −
ΣΣ˜a + β1Σ˜a.
First term =
(
a+1
0
)∑k1
i2=1
T ⋆i2(T
⋆
i2
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i2 − a)β
a+1
i2
−
(
a
0
)∑k1
i2=1
T ⋆i2
2(T ⋆i2 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i2
− a+ 1)βa+1i2
+a
(
a
0
)∑k1
i2=1
T ⋆i2(T
⋆
i2
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i2 − a+ 1)β
a
i2
β1
= a
∑k1
i2=1
T ⋆i2(T
⋆
i2
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i2 − a+ 1)β
a
i2
(β1 − βi2)
For s = 1, 2, · · · a,
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(s+ 1)th term =
(
a+1
s
)∑
i1 6=i2
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)T
⋆
i2
(T ⋆i2 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i2
− a+ 1− s+ 1)βsi1β
a+1−s
i2
−
(
a
s
)∑
i1 6=i2
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)T
⋆
i2
2(T ⋆i2 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i2
− a− s+ 1)βsi1β
a+1−s
i2
−
(
a
s−1
)∑
i1 6=i2
T ⋆i1
2(T ⋆i1 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i1
− s+ 2)T ⋆i2(T
⋆
i2
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i2 − a− s)β
s
i1
βa+1−si2
+aβ1
(
a
s
)∑
i1 6=i2
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)T
⋆
i2
(T ⋆i2 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i2
− a− s+ 1)βsi1β
a−s
i2
=
(
a
s
)∑
i1 6=i2
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)T
⋆
i2
(T ⋆i2 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i2
− a− s+ 1)(−a− s)βsi1β
a+1−s
i2
−
(
a
s−1
)
(s− 1)
∑
i1 6=i2
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 2)T
⋆
i2
(T ⋆i2 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i2
− a− s)βsi1β
a+1−s
i2
+aβ1
(
a
s
)∑
i1 6=i2
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)T
⋆
i2
(T ⋆i2 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i2
− a− s+ 1)βsi1β
a−s
i2
[Using Pascal’s rule
(
a+1
s
)
=
(
a
s
)
+
(
a
s−1
)
]
= a
(
a
s
)∑
i1 6=i2
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)T
⋆
i2
(T ⋆i2 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i2
− a− s+ 1)βsi1β
a−s
i2
(β1 − βi2)
+
(
a
s
)
sβ1
∑
i1 6=i2
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)T
⋆
i2
(T ⋆i2 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i2
− a− s+ 1)βsi1β
a−s
i2
−
(
a
s−1
)
(s− 1)
∑
i1 6=i2
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 2)T
⋆
i2
2(T ⋆i2 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i2
− a− s)βsi1β
a+1−s
i2
≥
(
a
s
)
sβ1
∑
i1 6=i2
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)T
⋆
i2
(T ⋆i2 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i2
− a− s+ 1)βsi1β
a−s
i2
−
(
a
s−1
)
(s− 1)
∑
i1 6=i2
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s− 1 + 1)T
⋆
i2
2(T ⋆i2 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i2
− a− (s− 1) + 1)βsi1β
a−(s−1)
i2
[Since, β1 ≥ βi∀i]
In the last expression, let us denote the first term by Term(s, β1) and the second term
by Term(s− 1, β). Note that since β1 ≥ βi∀i T erm(s, β1)− Term(s, β) ≥ 0.
(a+ 2)th term =
(
a+ 1
a+ 1
) k1∑
i1=1
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − a)β
a+1
i1
−
(
a
a
) k1∑
i1=1
T ⋆i1
2(T ⋆i1 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i1
− a+ 1)βa+1i1
Thus, it can be clearly seen that,
Σ˜a+1 − Σ1Σ˜a + β1Σ˜a
≥ Term(1, β1) + Term(2, β1)− Term(1, β) + Term(3, β1)− Term(2, β)
+ · · ·+ Term(a, β1)− Term(a− 1, β) + (
(
a+1
a+1
)∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − a)β
a+1
i1
)− Term(a, β)
≥ 0
Hence, (12) is true for k1 = 2 for any a. Now, let it be true for some k1 = k10 ,
k10 ∈ {2, 3, . . . }. We will show then that (12) is true for k1 = k10 + 1.
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Case: k1 = k10 + 1: The general expression for Σ˜a can be given by the following expres-
sion.
Σ˜a =
∑
a1+a2+···+ak1=a
a!
a1! · · · ak1 !
∑
i1 6=i2···6=ik1
T ⋆i1 . . . (T
⋆
i1
− a1 + 1) . . . T
⋆
ik1
. . . (T ⋆ik1
− ak1 + 1)β
a1
i1
βa2i2 . . . β
ak1
ik1
Since for any {a1, a2, · · · , ak1 ≥ 0,
∑k1
i=1 ai = a :
a!
a1!a2!···ak1 !
= a!
a!!(a−a1)!
(a−a1)!
a2!a3!···ak1 !
}, we can
write,
Σ˜a =
a∑
s=0
a!
s!(a− s)!
k1∑
i1=1
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)β
s
i1
Σ˜(a−s,k10)
where Σ˜(s,k10) = s!Σs for k10 categories instead of k1 = k10 +1 categories. Like before, we
write down the terms of Σ˜a+1 − ΣΣ˜a + β1Σ˜a.
First term = Σ˜(a+1,k10 ) −
∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1βi1Σ˜(a,k10 ) − Σ˜(a,k10 )Σ˜(1,k10) + aβ1Σ˜(a,k10 )
= (Σ˜(a+1,k10 ) − Σ˜(a,k10 )Σ˜(1,k10 ) + aβ1Σ˜(a,k10 ))−
∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1βi1Σ˜(a,k10 )
≥ −
∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1βi1Σ˜(a,k10 ) [by Assumption over size k10 ]
For s = 1, 2, · · · a,
(s+ 1)th term = (a+1)!
s!(a−s+1)!
∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)β
s
i1
Σ˜(a−s+1,k10 )
− a!
s!(a−s)!
∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1
2(T ⋆i1 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i1
− s+ 1)βs+1i1 Σ˜(a−s,k10 )
−( a!
s!(a−s)!
∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)β
s
i1
Σ˜(a−s,k10 ))(Σ˜(1,k10 ))
+aβ1
a!
s!(a−s)!
∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)β
s
i1
Σ˜(a−s,k10 )
=
(
a
s
)∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)β
s
i1
(Σ˜(a+1−s,k10 ) − Σ˜(a−s,k10 )Σ˜(1,k10 ) + (a− s)β1Σ˜(a−s,k10 ))
+
(
a
s−1
)∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)β
s
i1
(Σ˜(a−s−1,k10 )
−
(
a
s
)∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1
2(T ⋆i1 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i1
− s+ 1)βs+1i1 (Σ˜(a−s,k10 )
+sβ1
(
a
s
)∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)β
s
i1
(Σ˜(a−s,k10 ) [ Using Pascal’s rule]
≥ +
(
a
s−1
)∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)β
s
i1
(Σ˜(a−s−1,k10 )
−
(
a
s
)∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1
2(T ⋆i1 − 1) · · · (T
⋆
i1
− s+ 1)βs+1i1 (Σ˜(a−s,k10 )
+sβ1
(
a
s
)∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − s+ 1)β
s
i1
(Σ˜(a−s,k10 ) [ Using Assumption on size k10 ]
(a+ 2)th term =
k1∑
i1=1
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − a)β
a+1
i1
Summing all the elements we get,
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Σ˜a+1 − ΣΣ˜a + β1Σ˜a
=
(
a
1
)∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1βi1Σ˜(a−1,k10 )(β1 − βi1) +
(
a
2
)∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1)β2i1Σ˜(a−2,k10 )(β1 − βi1)
+ · · ·+
(
a
a
)∑k1
i1=1
T ⋆i1(T
⋆
i1
− 1) · · · (T ⋆i1 − a+ 1)β
a
i1
(β1 − βi1) ≥ 0 [ Since β1 ≥ βi∀i]
Thus the statement is true for k1 = k10 + 1 if true for k10 for any a ≥ 1. Thus, we see
(12) always holds and hence the proof.
Proof to Lemma 3.2
For T1 ≥ 2, ψ(1, θ) = ψ(T1, θ) iff
1−θ
1−θ+θ2 =
T1−θ
T1(T1−θ)+θ2
, i.e., θ = T1
T1+1
. Consider,
h(θ) =


ψ(1, θ) , if θ < T1
T1+1
ψ(T1, θ) , if θ ≥
T1
T1+1
Note that, h(θ) is continuous and strictly decreasing in θ ∈ (0, 1) with h(0) = 1, h(T1) = 0.
By Mean Value Theorem, there must exist a θ⋆ ∈ (0, T1) such that h(θ
⋆) = ξ for 0 < ξ < 1.
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